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A  once-familiar  but  long-neglected  acronym  has  reappeared 
in newspapers in recent weeks. We have read that the G-20 
meeting in London endorsed a proposal that the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) should create $250 billion in Special 
Drawing Rights (SDRs). We have been told that one problem 
with this proposal is that most of the SDR allocation would 
accrue to countries that are unlikely to use them, and some 
readers may have seen proposed ways around this difficulty. 
We have read that the governor of the People’s Bank of China, 
Zhou Xiaochuan, has proposed that the SDR should gradually 
displace the dollar at the center of the international monetary 
system and that surplus countries should be able to convert 
their dollar holdings into SDR-denominated assets. No one can 
doubt that the SDR is back.
But what is an SDR? Yes, SDR stands for Special Drawing 
Right, but that hardly answers the question. How and why did 
the SDR originate? How did it get its strange name? How many 
are there, who holds them, and what can they be used for? Do 
the rather-distinct proposals outlined above all refer to the same 
animal? How are these proposals interrelated? Can one specu-
late usefully about the future of the SDR? This policy brief aims 
to answer such questions.
History
In 1960 one of the most original analysts of the postwar inter-
national monetary system, the Belgian/US economist Robert 
Triffin, published a small volume with a big thesis called Gold 
and the Dollar Crisis.1 He argued that the system that had been 
agreed at Bretton Woods and had just come into operation 
would not last because its inner workings contained an internal 
contradiction. Apart from gold, whose supply was small and 
erratic, the increase in demand for international liquidity could 
be satisfied only if the reserve center, the United States, ran a 
payments deficit to supply more dollars to the world. But such 
deficits were bound to undermine confidence in an unchanged 
link of the US dollar to gold. The Triffin Dilemma posited that 
the world therefore confronted a choice between running short 
of liquidity and undermining confidence in the dollar, which 
was destined sooner or later to produce a crisis. 
Analysts argued that the system had other problems, such 
as the lack of a crisis-proof adjustment mechanism as a result 
of widespread unwillingness to change exchange rates except as 
a last resort. But officials decided that the problem they could 
solve best, or at least the one they would solve first, was the 
Triffin Dilemma. Their solution was to create a synthetic reserve 
asset to supplement the supply of gold. Its price was fixed in 
terms of gold at exactly the same level as $1, so that SDR1 
= $1. Because of a continuing disagreement over whether the 
new reserve asset should be considered money (“paper gold”) or 
credit (since countries receiving assets had to reconstitute a part 
of their endowments in due course), it was given the anodyne 
1. Robert Triffin, 1960, Gold and the Dollar Crisis: The Future of Convertibility, 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
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name, Special Drawing Right. Hence we still live with the term 
SDRs.
The first SDRs, 3 billion of them, were created and allocated 
among members of the IMF in proportion to their quotas on 
January 1, 1970. The rationale for making, by the standards of 
the time, such a sizeable allocation was the prospect of a reserve 
shortage as a result of stringent US monetary policy in 1969. 
Further allocations of approximately SDR 3 billion a year were 
agreed simultaneously for the following two years: The actual 
allocations were SDR 2.9 billion in 1971 and SDR 3.4 billion 
in 1972. At the end of that process the SDR constituted some 
9.5 percent of the world’s stock of nongold reserve assets.
However, before the last of these allocations had occurred, 
the world was no longer short of liquidity. Monetary stringency 
had led to a US slowdown, and the US Federal Reserve, seeing 
that this posed a threat to the president’s reelection, stepped on 
the monetary accelerator. This resulted in an explosion of inter-
national liquidity and the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
system, and in 1972 the IMF convened a Committee of Twenty 
(C-20), based on the 20 constituency chairs then operative in 
the Fund, to agree on an appropriate reform of the international 
monetary system.
The state of thought at the time can be gleaned from a 
conference convened by the IMF in 1970 to discuss the criteria 
that should govern reserve creation. The prevailing view saw the 
IMF as essentially controlling the world’s reserve base, consisting 
of a more-or-less fixed supply of gold plus a consciously variable 
quantity of SDRs. Countries would choose to hold dollars and 
secondary reserve currencies in a fairly fixed relationship to their 
holdings of primary reserve assets and they would issue domes-
tic money more or less in proportion to their reserve holdings. 
Hence by varying its issues of SDRs the IMF could determine 
the monetary evolution of the world. This being the heyday 
of monetarism versus Keynesianism, the big bone of conten-
tion was whether the IMF should allocate SDRs so as to secure 
an  equilibrium  long-run  monetary  growth  rate  independent 
of short-run fluctuations in aggregate demand or whether it 
should try to engage in short-run countercyclical fine-tuning. 
The monetarists won, and so the IMF continued to determine 
the rate of SDR allocations for multiyear “basic periods,” based 
on prospective shortages of reserves.
The Europeans came to the C-20 assuming that its mandate 
was to secure such a world. But it turned out that European 
preoccupations were not shared by others. First, the United 
States was not prepared to consign the advantages it accrued 
from issuing the world’s reserve currency, at least not without 
much-stronger assurances that it could rely on the rest of the 
world to adjust when needed, which it sought to achieve by the 
institution of a “reserve indicator” system. Under such a system 
each IMF member would have been assigned—there was no 
agreement on how—a target level of reserves and would have 
then assumed an obligation to adjust so as to keep its reserves 
within some limits around this target. Specifically, if reserves 
hit an upper limit of some specified, proportionate difference 
from the reserve target, the country would have been obliged 
either to revalue or to take other adjustment measures. Defi-
cit countries would have been under a symmetrical obligation 
to adjust if they hit a lower reserve limit. Second, in an early 
flexing of its muscles, the developing world was prepared to 
enthrone the SDR only in return for an “aid link.” Under such a 
system a disproportionate share of new SDR issues would have 
accrued, directly or indirectly,2 to developing countries, with 
the result that they would have been net debtors to the SDR 
account, just as the United States is a net debtor in dollars under 
a dollar-based system. Since the major powers could not agree 
on objectives, the C-20 did not reach any agreement, and the 
international monetary system evolved into the largely ruleless 
arrangements of the past 35-odd years.
However,  there  was  a  further  important  development 
regarding the SDR during the period of the C-20. When it was 
finally conceded in 1973 that the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods system was permanent and that the exchange rates of 
the major currencies would float against one another in the 
future, the previous practice of valuing the SDR in terms of 
only one currency, the US dollar, appeared distinctly anoma-
lous. The only viable alternative in a system of predominantly 
floating exchange rates was to value the SDR as equal to a basket 
of currencies. In the first instance this basket consisted of the 
16 currencies whose issuers each accounted for more than 1 
percent of world exports. This basket was subsequently revised 
to the G-5 currencies, and it is now a basket of four, since the 
French franc and the Deutschmark have both been merged into 
the euro. Since 1972 the IMF has used the SDR as its basic unit 
of account, so that all the Fund’s transactions are denominated 
in SDRs.
The IMF has periodically debated whether to create addi-
tional SDRs, but with one exception it has always concluded that 
the additional reserves stemming from the US deficit obviated 
2. In one version of the aid link, newly issued SDRs would have gone to 
multilateral development banks like the World Bank.
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a reserve shortage that would justify additional SDR creation. 
The lone exception occurred in 1978, when major reserve hold-
ers did not wish to increase their dollar holdings. Instead, there 
was active consideration at that time of creating a substitution 
account at the Fund. This would have entitled reserve holders to 
sell dollars to the Fund in exchange for an equivalent amount of 
SDRs at the current market exchange rate. According to normal 
practice, the Fund would have thereby obtained an SDR claim 
on the United States, and hence the United States would have 
been obliged to pay the Fund sufficient dollars to make up for 
any subsequent depreciation in the value of the dollar in terms 
of the SDR (just as the United States would have profited by any 
subsequent appreciation of the dollar, which in fact happened). 
But the United States wished to have a dollar-denominated 
debt, and this difference remained to the end. However, there 
was sufficient suspicion of the dollar at that time to make most 
reserve holders reluctant to accept more dollars, and so a new 
SDR allocation was agreed. The basic period agreed was again 
three years (against the five years that were supposed to be 
normal), and the issue was to be about SDR 4 billion per year.
There has periodically been debate about the value of creat-
ing a reserve asset that would principally accrue to those coun-
tries with large IMF quotas (the industrial countries) rather 
than to those in need of additional reserves (largely the develop-
ing countries). It has been suggested that this could be avoided 
by having the industrial countries donate their excess reserves 
to a pool that could be tapped by countries in need. Several 
questions can be raised about such proposals. First, would such 
transactions be legal under the present IMF Articles? Opinions 
differ, but if not, the proposal would require a new amendment. 
Second, because the SDR is an interest-bearing asset, countries 
that tap such a pool would need to accept responsibility for 
servicing the SDRs they receive, unless this is to be another 
form of aid.3 Would advanced countries trust developing coun-
3. Admittedly the interest rate is low, being the average of defined money-mar-
ket rates in the currencies that compose the SDR basket. The standard analysis 
is that countries benefit financially from receiving an SDR allocation because 
tries to service the SDRs tapped from such a pool, or would 
they regard default as a possibility? Third, some way of distrib-
uting the SDRs in the pool among claimants would need to 
be devised. One method would be to distribute these SDRs in 
proportion to IMF quotas, though this would imply acceptance 
of the legitimacy of the IMF’s quota arrangements and would 
make  the  division  between  donors  and  recipients  a  critical 
margin. Further, some advanced countries might have reserva-
tions about making their share of an SDR allocation available to 
certain developing countries.
In  1997  the  IMF  agreed  on  a  Fourth  Amendment  to 
the Articles, which involved doubling the quantity of SDRs 
outstanding.  The  additional  allocation  of  SDR  21.4  billion 
would have been distributed in such a way as to bring each 
country’s cumulative allocation up to the same percentage as its 
1997 quota. Thus the bulk of the allocation would have been 
distributed to members that had joined after the earlier alloca-
tions, principally the former communist countries. However, 
amending the Articles requires an 85-percent majority approval, 
and since the United States has a quota of about 17 percent, 
it  effectively  has  a  veto  over  such  actions.  Because  the  US 
Congress has not yet ratified this amendment (if only because 
Congress has not previously been asked to ratify it), the amend-
ment has not come into effect and countries have not received 
the additional SDR allocations that were agreed. This is one 
of several IMF reforms requiring congressional action that the 
Obama administration has recently submitted to Congress for 
approval.
Basic Facts
There are now 21.4 billion SDRs in existence. As a proportion 
of total world (nongold) reserves, this is less than a derisory 0.5 
percent. They were originally distributed in proportion to coun-
tries’ IMF quotas on the dates of allocation, but since then they 
have tended to gravitate from developing countries in deficit 
toward industrial countries in surplus. When a country wishes 
to use some of its SDRs, it finds a country (or the IMF) that is 
willing to receive the SDRs and supply a reserve currency (in 
practice the US dollar) in exchange; SDRs cannot be spent in 
the market.
When the SDR was first created, countries had a duty to 
hold, or if necessary rebuild, some proportion of the SDR allo-
cations they had originally received. In 1981 this “reconstitution 
provision” was abrogated, which is slightly less definitive than 
being abolished. It was argued that this marked a step toward 
they get a long-term loan—even if they have limited creditworthiness—at the 
short-term interest rate of the most creditworthy countries.
The dollar system bestows on the United 
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acceptance of the SDR as money, since countries face no obliga-
tion to reestablish their currency holdings, but they are bound 
to repay credit.
The SDR is currently defined as a basket consisting of:
n  US dollar, 63.2 cents;
n  Euro, 41.0 euro cents;
n  Japanese yen, 18.4 yen; and
n  Pound sterling, 9.03 pence.
The  percentage  weights  used  for  calculating  the  above 
figures were 44 percent for the US dollar, 34 percent for the 
euro, and 11 percent each for the Japanese yen and the pound 
sterling. The basket is recalculated every five years, most recently 
on the basis of these weights and market exchange rates for the 
three months preceding the last SDR recalculation on Decem-
ber 30, 2005. The SDR interest rate is an average of defined, 
short-term, money-market interest rates of the four currencies 
in the basket, with similar weights to those used in defining the 
value of the SDR. This figure is calculated weekly.
The creation of a substitution account, which would enable 
countries to exchange dollars for SDRs, has been proposed at 
two periods in history. The first was after the breakdown of 
the Bretton Woods system in 1971–73, when many countries 
feared for the future value of their dollar holdings. The second 
was the period of dollar weakness in the late 1970s. The basic 
proposal was that dollar holders would have the right to pres-
ent their excess dollar holdings to the IMF, which would then 
issue an equivalent value of SDRs. If the IMF had maintained 
its normal practice of transacting with members exclusively in 
SDRs, this would have resulted in the United States accepting 
an SDR-denominated liability. US reluctance to accept such 
liabilities presumably contributed to the failure on both occa-
sions to agree on a substitution account.
There are four major differences between an SDR-centered 
system and a dollar-centered system such as we have had in 
recent years. First, there is the issue of elasticity of reserve supply. 
The supply of dollar reserves depends upon the US balance of 
payments position and can therefore expand in response to an 
increase in demand as well as to an exogenously determined 
increase in the US payments deficit. In contrast, the supply of 
SDRs depends on an administrative decision of the IMF, and 
if the supply of competing reserve assets (in practice dollars) 
has been tied down, the reserve supply will be unresponsive to 
demand except insofar as those administrative decisions respond. 
A  common  view  is  that  the  reserve  supply  should  respond 
automatically to variations in demand—because the alternative 
would be a destructive attempt to achieve adjustment—but that 
exogenous variations in supply that may impose global inflation 
or deflation should be avoided. Opinions have differed sharply 
as to whether this view pointed to the dollar system or an SDR 
system being preferable.
Second, the dollar system bestows on the United States 
what the French, in the days of President de Gaulle and his 
economic maestro Jacques Rueff, used to describe as the “exor-
bitant privilege” of paying its debts in its own currency. Unlike 
every other country, the United States’ prospective future defi-
cit is not limited by the assets it currently holds plus what the 
international capital market will lend it. But note that it is a 
requirement that debts be settled by a transfer of assets rather 
than by an increase in liabilities that would resolve this asym-
metry. For this reason, “asset settlement” was a big issue in the 
C-20 negotiations.
Third, the two systems have different implications as to the 
pattern of payments imbalances and therefore the debt profiles 
of various countries. Under a dollar-centered system, increases 
in reserve supply come from an increase in the gross debt of 
the United States. In principle this increase in gross debt could 
be financed entirely by increased borrowing by the rest of the 
world from the United States, so that there would be no net 
increase in US debt. But in practice one expects that while a 
part of the reserve increase will be borrowed, a part will also 
take the form of increased current account surpluses outside the 
United States and therefore an increased US current account 
deficit. To the extent that this is true, the US net international 
investment position will go into higher debt. In contrast, an 
SDR-centered system that distributes SDRs in exact propor-
tion to the increases in demand for reserves would not require 
any country to increase its net debt. The increased allocation 
of SDRs a country receives will be an asset that offsets the 
country’s increased liability to the SDR account. In particular, 
there would be no need for the United States to increase its net 
indebtedness to feed the rest of the world’s increasing demand 
for reserves.
Fourth, the mirror image of the last point is what econo-
mists refer to as “seigniorage.” This refers to the fact that the 
issuer has a gain, or at least a potential gain, from issuing the 
zero-interest asset of money or the low-interest asset of reserves. 
It is clear that the United States gains by making a high-interest 
loan that is used to buy low-interest reserves from it: Its gain is 
the interest differential. If the reserve-holding country chooses 
to run a current account surplus to build up its reserves instead, 
this is presumed to be as disagreeable as taking the high-interest 
loan, since for an optimal solution the welfare effects of these two 
decisions must be equated at the margin. But it is not clear that 
the corresponding current account deficit is valued as much by 
the United States as the capital outflow, as is implicitly assumed 
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gain available from creating reserves through the SDR system 
instead of the dollar system.
What lies behind opposition to the SDR is the concern 
that SDRs are the liabilities of all members of the Fund, some 
of which are not highly creditworthy. It is the old concern that 
money must be “backed” by responsible parties. Insofar as the 
SDR is an interest-bearing asset, then it is certainly true that 
confidence to hold SDRs depends on certainty that interest will 
continue to be paid. Beyond that, “backing” would become 
relevant only in the event of dissolution of the scheme. It is the 
certainty that money will continue to be accepted by all parties, 
not who backs it, that determines the social acceptability of 
money. If the international community decides that it wants an 
SDR system, it can have it: All that is needed is to give credible 
assurances that it will continue to accept the SDR.
reForm ProPosals
Three paths can be envisaged for giving the SDR a greater role 
in the future. One proposal would turn the SDR into a privately 
held asset. A second would reform the international monetary 
system and put the SDR at its center, very much along the 
lines pursued in the C-20. A third would increase the supply of 
SDRs while retaining a predominantly dollar-centered system. 
The creation of a substitution account might accompany any of 
these systems, though it would be essential only in the second.
Private SDRs
From time to time there have been proposals to allow private 
parties to hold SDRs. One advantage from the standpoint of the 
official sector is that this would potentially make SDRs directly 
usable by official actors in intervention, which is by its nature a 
transaction between the official and private sectors. At present 
SDRs have to be converted into an intervention currency before 
they can be used in intervention, which presumably makes them 
less attractive to official holders. 
If private parties were permitted to hold SDRs, they might 
be held either to facilitate transactions or as an asset. Although it 
would in principle be possible to transact in SDRs even if a coun-
try were pegging its currency to a reserve currency like the dollar, 
this would be pointless: Private transactions in SDRs are likely 
to be restricted to cases in which the country is seeking to peg 
its currency to (or intervening so as to limit its variation in terms 
of) the SDR. This suggests that the SDR is unlikely to take off as 
a privately held asset, even if this were legal, unless a significant 
number of central banks decide to stabilize their currencies in 
terms of the SDR rather than in terms of some bilateral exchange 
rate or alternative basket. Such a development appears highly 
desirable, especially for countries whose trade is not dominated 
by transactions with a single major monetary bloc.
Under what conditions would private parties find it conve-
nient to hold assets in the form of SDRs? Presumably only if 
many of the world’s long-term assets were SDR-denominated, 
which would mean that they were denominated in terms of 
a basket of principal currencies (with specific weights) rather 
than in any individual currency. This would not help those 
who issue assets in countries with currencies that are already 
used to denominate debt. However, it may be attractive either 
to those who issue assets in countries whose currencies have 
not traditionally been used to denominate debt contracts or 
to those who want to undertake activities that straddle several 
currencies.  Until  now  there  has  been  almost  no  use  of  the 
SDR to denominate private debt contracts, although there is 
no obstacle to such denomination. Because there have been no 
private SDR-denominated contracts, there has been no pressure 
to allow private parties to hold SDRs. But there would be real 
social advantages to the widespread use of the SDR to denomi-
nate the debts of those whose currencies do not move closely 
with one of the major currencies. The fact that this has not yet 
occurred may be due to an “infant market” problem—no one 
has an incentive to be an early user of an asset whose appeal 
comes from its use by others—rather than any inherent unat-
tractiveness of the proposal. 
An International Monetary System Based on the SDR
Another way of enhancing the future role of the SDR is to make 
it the center of the international monetary system, as proposed 
in the C-20. The C-20 argued that this implied making it the 
principal reserve asset. The prima facie meaning of this phrase 
is that nearly all reserve holdings would consist of SDRs. In 
fact, however, the significant economic meaning of the phrase as 
interpreted by the C-20 is that the evolution of the SDR stock 
would determine the growth rate of total reserves, which would 
require merely that the total reserve stock be a fairly constant 
multiple of the quantity of SDRs. This implies some form of 
asset settlement: requiring countries that acquire reserve curren-
cies to convert these into SDRs rather than to hold onto them, 
since otherwise the total reserve stock would be influenced by 
Under a dollar-centered system, increases 
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the reserve-composition policies of member countries. It would 
also be necessary to create a substitution account to allow coun-
tries  to  convert  their  reserve-currency  holdings  above  some 
limit into SDRs. The C-20 declared that the SDR would be the 
numeraire, in terms of which each currency would express its 
central value (at that time it was assumed there would be such 
a thing). The contemporary equivalent of this proposal would 
be that countries should declare reference rates in terms of the 
SDR, ensuring that the countries whose currencies compose the 
SDR declare rates that are collectively consistent.
It rapidly became clear in the C-20 that the United States 
would agree to proposals to make the SDR the center of the inter-
national monetary system only if there were some mechanism of 
exerting strong adjustment pressures on countries in addition to 
asset settlement. It is not difficult to see why. Asset settlement 
by nature places pressure on deficit countries. In the absence of 
comparable pressure on surplus countries, all a surplus country 
would need to do to avoid adjustment pressure is to not adjust, 
throwing the entire burden of adjustment onto deficit countries. 
To avoid this danger the United States designed and proposed 
the reserve indicator system described previously. An obligation 
to take adjustment actions, including to revalue exchange rates 
in the absence of alternative concrete actions, provoked visceral 
objections from countries that had repeatedly witnessed specu-
lators enriched at the expense of their taxpayers when reserve 
levels had given warnings of impending exchange rate changes. 
This was a major reason why the C-20 failed to agree on the 
design of a new international monetary system.
There seems to be no technical reason why the world should 
not adopt such a system at the present time, presumably modi-
fied by the presence of floating exchange rates, which would 
therefore limit the SDR’s numeraire role to expressing reference 
rates. Since countries would not be setting their own exchange 
rates, they could not be enjoined to revalue if reserves hit an 
indicator level, so this obligation would have to be modified to 
that of changing their macroeconomic, e.g., fiscal, policy.
SDRs in a Dollar-Centered System
The fundamental respects in which the present world differs 
from that envisaged by the C-20 are that (a) today the exchange 
rates of almost all systemically significant countries float and (b) 
the main reserve asset is the dollar and not the SDR (a conse-
quence of which is the absence of asset settlement). It has just 
been argued that one could retain floating exchange rates within 
a system otherwise similar to that envisaged by the C-20. In this 
section I examine whether one could also enhance the role of 
the SDR within a system that retains both of the key features of 
present arrangements.
Suppose that in the present world one were to make regu-
lar allocations of SDRs of a size that would satisfy demand 
for greater reserve holdings. As noted earlier, there are several 
key ways in which such a system would differ from the pres-
ent dollar-based system: It may change the elasticity of reserve 
supply, it may alter the pattern of payment imbalances, and the 
distribution of seigniorage may differ. 
Consider  first  the  issue  of  reserve  supply.  Suppose  that 
the IMF curtailed the rate of SDR expansion in the hope of 
combating inflation. Countries would be entitled to accumulate 
dollars instead, and if the IMF had cut the rate of SDR growth 
to a level that did not satisfy the growth of demand for reserves, 
one would expect countries simply to shift back their reserve-
holding patterns to accumulate more dollars in view of the 
fewer SDRs. As long as countries retain the right to accumulate 
more dollars at the margin, it is unrealistic to expect to control 
the rate of reserve growth by varying the rate of the creation 
of  SDRs.  However,  a  critical  difference  from  the  reformed 
monetary regime envisaged by the C-20 is that a country that 
felt reserve growth to be excessive would be able to defend itself 
by allowing its exchange rate to appreciate without violating the 
letter or spirit of its international obligations.
This system would avoid the need for the United States to 
maintain a deficit to enable the supply of liquidity to grow. If in 
fact the rate of SDR creation satisfied the reserve-accumulation 
objectives of all countries, it would be possible to envisage the 
elimination of global imbalances. The only exception would be 
if countries were anxious for current account surpluses because 
they preferred to maintain an export surplus rather than simply 
to build up reserves.
The obverse of the obligation to adjust is the distribution of 
the benefit of seigniorage. Countries would reap this in propor-
tion to their IMF quotas. If the Asian countries maintained 
high reserve-accumulation objectives relative to the size of their 
IMF quotas, then they would still need to earn or borrow a part 
of their additional reserves, but a part would accrue free of the 
need to adjust, as of right. Presumably the traditional powers in 
the IMF, primarily European countries, would receive seignior-
age benefits that outweighed their reserve-accumulation objec-
tives. The long-proposed reforms to IMF quotas would reduce 
but not eliminate this discrepancy, since they do not envisage 
rewarding the Asian countries for their high reserve-accumula-
tion objectives.
The recent G-20 summit in London 
proposed that the IMF issue $250 billion 
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The  role  of  a  substitution  account  in  a  dollar-centered 
system  would  be  entirely  to  increase  the  portfolio  choices 
available to reserve holders. It would enable a reserve holder 
to convert some of its dollar holdings into SDRs, and vice 
versa if the substitution account were designed to permit this. 
There would be no ex ante profit in such switches since the 
market determines the exchange rate and the SDR’s interest rate 
is consistent with this, nor would there be any market effects 
of official switches. It would of course be necessary to deter-
mine whether liabilities to the substitution account should be 
SDR denominated or subject to some ad hoc alternative. But 
in neither case would the creation of a substitution account 
impose ex ante changes in wealth.
One  of  the  proposals  endorsed  by  the  G-20  leaders  in 
London in April 2009 was for a renewed SDR issue of $250 
billion of SDRs. This would be the first issue to be approved 
since 1978. The call was made despite the fact that the total 
reserve stock (excluding gold, which hardly counts as a reserve 
asset  these  days)  has  increased  even  faster  than  its  natural 
comparators (trade and “world GDP,” which should be called 
GWP) in recent years.4 But the fact that the world is now in a 
severe recession outweighed the rapid growth in dollar reserves 
and convinced the G-20 leaders that the world would benefit 
from an increase in purchasing power. At least when the world 
is in a severe recession, as now, it appears that current leaders 
are dominated by a desire to apply Keynesian pump-priming 
rather than subscribing to the 1970s monetarist logic that SDRs 
should act strictly as a reserve supplement. But even after an 
increase that appears massive in comparison with previous SDR 
issues, SDRs would only account for approximately 5 percent 
of the world’s total nongold reserve stock, as opposed to the   
9.5 percent that prevailed after completion of the first basic 
period in 1972.
4. Reserves increased by 1,938 percent between 1975 and the end of 2008, in 
comparison with a 1,758 percent increase in visible trade and an expansion in 
nominal world GDP of 868 percent.
It would not be technically difficult for the IMF to issue 
liabilities such as bonds denominated in SDRs, as has been 
proposed recently by a number of emerging-market economies. 
Indeed, the important issues raised by these proposals for the 
IMF to issue bonds concern not denomination but the limited 
maturity of bonds versus the indeterminate duration of a loan 
under the New Arrangements to Borrow. The attraction seen in 
the former is that fixed maturity implies that countries would 
be able to make money available to the IMF during this time of 
crisis without jeopardizing their future leverage to increase their 
representation in the Fund.
conclusions
The world created a fiat reserve currency almost 40 years ago. It 
was given an anodyne name because of a dispute that in retro-
spect looks theological, but it is still called the SDR. Shortly 
afterward it was given a basis of valuation well adapted to a 
world of floating exchange rates and an interest rate to match 
that jointly eliminate any incentive to arbitrage between its 
reserve-currency constituents and the SDR (so long as all the 
currencies  used  for  valuation  float).  It  has  since  been  used 
mainly in the prosaic role of providing a unit of account for its 
issuer, the IMF. SDRs were issued in 1970–72 and 1979–81, 
and a new issue intended to equalize holdings relative to the 
IMF quotas of all members was approved by the members in 
1997 but has never been ratified. The recent G-20 summit in 
London proposed that the IMF issue $250 billion of SDRs to 
help combat the recession, and the Obama administration is 
currently calling on Congress to ratify the agreement of 1997. 
Of more fundamental importance is the recent call by China 
for it to be able to hold a much higher proportion of its reserve 
stock in SDRs instead of dollars. One way of accomplishing this 
would be to create a substitution account. A complementary 
approach would be to start regular SDR allocations. This would 
permit the world’s reserve stock to grow without creating pressure 
for payments imbalances such as have recently troubled the world, 
while at the same time securing a distribution of the benefits of 
seigniorage that is closer to most people’s concept of equity.
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If in fact the rate of SDR creation satisfied 
the reserve-accumulation objectives of all 
countries, it would be possible to envisage 
the elimination of global imbalances.